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FLIGHT TESTS OF A WIDE-ANGLE, INDIRECT OPTICAL VIEWING SYSTEM 
IN A HIGH-PERFORMANCE JET AIRCRAFT 
By Garrison P. Layton, Jr. , and William H. Dana 
Flight Research Center 
SUMMARY 
A wide-angle, indirect optical viewing system was qualitatively evaluated in an 
F-104B aircraft as a means of providing visual reference to the pilot. Safe and ac- 
ceptable performance using the indirect viewing system was demonstrated for all 
phases of daytime visual flight. Landings were performed in both the conventional and 
low lift-drag-ratio configurations. When the horizon was in the field of view, aircraft 
attitude sensing with the optics was satisfactory about all axes except pitch attitude in 
climbing flight. This degraded pitch-attitude sensing was due to the poor resolution 
at the bottom of the field and the lack of view to the sides. 
A night flight was also performed. The system, in its present form, was con- 
sidered unacceptable for this use because of large light losses and degraded 
resolution. 
It was evident in the study that additional view directly to the side is required for 
performing circling approaches. 
INTRODUCTION 
A major problem in the design of modern aerospace vehicles such as the super- 
sonic transport and lifting reentry bodies is the provision of adequate exterior visual 
reference for the pilot. Because of various geometric and aerodynamic constraints , 
the use of conventional windows in these vehicles to provide the necessary visual ref- 
erences is impractical. The NASA Flight Research Center has undertaken a compre- 
hensive program to define an indirect optical viewing system with which a pilot will 
feel comfortable and confident in performing all normal flight maneuvers. In the 
initial phase of the program, an indirect viewing system was investigated in a low- 
speed airplane (ref. 1). The investigation was then extended to an evaluation of an 
indirect viewing system in an F-104B high-performance jet aircraft (fig. 1). This 
paper presents the qualitative results of this evaluation. 
Figure 1.- F-104B test aircraft. 
SYMBOLS 
The units used for the physical quantities in this paper are given in the U. S. 
Customary Units and, parenthetically, in the International System of Units (SI). 
Factors relating the two systems are  presented in reference 2. 
g acceleration due to gravity, feet/second2 (meters/second2) 
L distance from eyes to object, feet (meters) 
S one-half of optical separation, feet (meters) 
t time, seconds 
V velocity, feet/second (meters/second) 
a eye -convergence angle, degrees (radians) 
DESCRIPTION OF THE OPTICAL SYSTEM AND INSTALLATION 
Optical System 
The optical system tested (fig. 2) consisted of two wide-angle periscopes, each 
circular field of view (fig. 3). The magnification was 1:1, 
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Aircraft canopy line 
Figure 2.- Optical layout of the system. 
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Figure 3.- Three-view of test aircraft showing field of view. 
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which provided true direction of objects within the field of view. The observer's eyes 
were effectively at the optical objective location on top of the aircraft with 15 inches 
(0.38 meter) of horizontal separation, as shown in figures 1 and 2. This arrangement 
produced an elevated, stereoscopically exaggerated view of the outside world, as 
Figure 4.- Subjective impression of enhanced stereopsis. 
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Figure 5.- Optical-system schematic. 
shown in figure 4. In use, the 
system did not permit head move- 
ment, inasmuch as the pilot's 
eyes had to be looking straight for- 
ward, with an eye relief of ap- 
proximately 0 .83  inch (21 milli- 
meters) (fig. 5). The exit pupils 
were 0.55  inch (14 millimeters) in 
diameter, just large enough to 
permit norma! eye rotation without 
loss of the field of view. The sepa- 
ration of the exit pupils was adjus- 
table so that the best f i t  could be 
obtained for each pilot's inter- 
pupillary separation. 
The optical characteristics of 
the system tested can be assessed 
in terms of field error  (barrel and 
pincushion distortion) , lateral 
color aberration, and resolution. 
The field e r ror  was very small and 
could be observed only by moving 
the eye rapidly across the field. 
Since the system progressed from 
a small amount of barrel distortion 
at the center to a slight pincushion 
distortion at the outside of the 
field, small artificial rotations and 
velocity differences could be 
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detected. 
moving, as a result of the masking effect of normal aircraft vibrations. 
Field e r ror  was , however, completely unnoticeable when the aircraft was 
Lateral color aberrations were also unobservable with the aircraft in motion. 
This aberration was negligible for objects infinitely far away and became increasingly 
apparent for closer objects. For an object 20 feet (6.1 meters) away, both red-green 
fringes and yellow-blue fringes could be observed, depending on eye location and angle 
of viewing into the system. 
Resolution was essentially that of the normal eye for the center 45" - radian of 
each periscope. The outer part of each field of view had a noticeable deterioration; 
however, this was largely dependent on eye position. The separation of the two peri- 
scopes was adjusted to give the pilot the best possible resolution in the overlap area 
with the eyes looking straight ahead, at some expense to resolution at the edges of the 
field of view. In particular, the side portions of the field of view tended to have poor 
resolution to the extent that they were useful only for recognition and not detailed 
viewing. This was not predominantly a fault of the optical system, however, since it 
is not possible for the eyes to see clearly to the side without head rotation, even under 
normal conditions. 
(x ) 
In addition to the preceding characteristics , the system had approximately 
13-percent transmittance, which is similar to that of sunglasses, and the field ap- . 
peared slightly yellow. 
The optics were adjusted to provide a total field of view of 130" by 90" (2.3 radians 
by 
centerline (fig. 3), thus providing an overlap area of 50" (0.87 radian) centered about 
the fuselage centerline. The aiming angle, however, could be varied from 8" to 35" 
(0.14 radian to 0.61 radian). The 20" (0.35 radian) aiming angle selected was less 
than was considered necessary in the investigation of reference 1 but, in order to 
obtain the clearest possible vision in the overlap area, was more nearly optimum for 
the optics evaluated in this study. 
radian by aiming the objectives 20" (0.35 radian) to the side of the fuselage ) 
Installation 
The optics were mounted to a modified sheet-aluminum center-section canopy to 
The system provide indirect vision to the pilot in the rear seat (figs. 6(a) and 6(b)). 
was adjusted to yield the view angles shown in figure 5 and mechanized to provide both 
variable overlap angles and variable interpupillary distances. This flexibility neces - 
sitated having both the eyepiece and relay section angles adjustable. 
To provide the pilot with sufficient information with which to fly the aircraft, 
basic flight information--airspeed, altitude, and power setting--was presented on a 
modified center panel (fig. 7). 
Inasmuch as the F-104B airplane is fitted with ejection seats, it was necessary 
for the optical system to clear the ejection envelope in the event of an emergency. 
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'I Domesh Objective7 
(a) Side view. 
(b) Rear view. 
Figure 6.- Optics in viewing position. 
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This was accomplished by pneumatically folding the optics downward from a hinge point 
at the forward end of the relay section (fig. 7). 
Figure 7.- Pilot’s instrument panel and folded optics. 
EVALUATION PROCEDURE AND TEST FLIGHTS 
The evaluation procedure was strictly qualitative, with no attempt to obtain nu- 
merical data except for pilot estimates of touchdown er ror  and height misjudgment. 
A safety pilot was in the front seat on all flights to take notes and corrective action 
when necessary. 
Five pilots in the program each flew two flights to evaluate the system. One other 
pilot flew one flight. On each of the flights a series of low lift-drag-ratio approaches 
was made to the dry lakebed runway at Edwards Air Force Base, with about 25 percent 
of the approaches carried to touchdown. The low lift-drag-ratio approaches (fig. 8) 
were made with 77-percent power and an indicated airspeed of 300 knots 
(150 meters/second), which yielded a lift-drag ratio of 4. The total time for this 
maneuver was approximately 2 minutes from high key at an altitude of 25,000 feet to 
30,000 feet (7.6 kilometers to 9.2 kilometers) to touchdown. After these maneuvers 
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were completed, a series of conventional power -on landings was made on the runway 
(fig. 9). 
Basc 
I (5.5 km) 
Altitude = 12,000 ft to 15,000 ft 
I Altitude = 25,000 ft to 30,000 ft (7.6 km to 9.2 km) 
Figure 8.- Circling low lift-drag-ratio approach. 
Downwind t = 120 sec = -77 
7 Touchdown t = 240 sec 
Final approach I - 
Initial approach 
Altitude - 1,500 ft (0.46 km) 
* L =4.0 n. mi. (7.4 km) 
/Runway - 15,000 ft (4.6 km) I 
-Break 
t = 0 set 
Figme 9.- Conventional approach. 
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In addition to the preceding flights, 
two special flights were conducted, one 
at night and one cross-country. The 
night flight consisted of three low lift- 
drag-ratio landing attempts and two con- 
ventional landings. The cross-country 
flight consisted of navigating to three 
landing fields within a 100-mile 
(160-kilometer) radius of Edwards Air 
Force Base and making conventional 
landings at each field. The fields were: 
George Air Force Base, Naval Ordnance 
Test Station at China Lake, Calif. , and 
Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, Calif. 
China lake 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The data obtained during the pro- 
gram were qualitative comments by the 
pilots and the sa€ety pilots. The re- 
sponses to questionnaires given to the 
pilot and the safety pilot are  summa- 
rized in appendix A. The intent of these 
questionnaires was to provide a basis on 
which to compare the comments of all 
the participating pilots. Additional 
pilots' notes are presented in appendix B. 
The pilot's and safety pilot's comments 
on the cross-country flight are presented 
in appendix C y  and the pilot's notes on 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  I  the night flight are  presented in appen- 
r I T -  dix D. The following discussions and 
results are based on these pilot opinions. 
Figure 10.- Course flown on cross-country flight. 
General Comments 
The 13 flights made during the program consisted of 33 low lift-drag-ratio low 
approaches , 8 low lift-drag-ratio landings , and 41 conventional landings in which the 
pilots used the viewing system with no assistance from the safety pilots. Also, the 
need arose to check out a pilot in the F-104B airplane. The checkout was accomplished 
with the check pilot using the viewing system, which provides an indication of the 
pilot's confidence in the system. 
Several system deficiencies were noted that appeared to be common to all phases 
of flight. The most serious deficiency was the smallness (0 .55  in. (14 mm)) of the 
exit pupil. Vibration while on the ground and acceleration forces while flying some- 
times caused the pilot's eyes to shift momentarily out of the exit pupils. Also, while 
looking toward the extreme edges of the field, the pilot's normal eye rotation 
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frequently translated the pupils of his eyes to the outer edges of the exit pupil. The 
pilots also objected somewhat to the necessity of holding their heads in a fixed position 
so close to a rigid object. 
Another system deficiency noted by the pilots was that basic flight information-- 
airspeed, altitude, and power setting--was not presented in a readily accessible man- 
ner. To use the instruments available on the center panel, the pilots had to move out 
of the exit pupil. This was a relatively time-consuming operation compared with 
normal instrument cross-checks. When moving back into the exit pupils, the pilot's 
eyes had to adapt to the distortions and misalinements of the system. All of the pilots 
believed that they could have flown consistently better if this flight information had 
been provided in the optics. 
Takeoff and Climbout 
The pilots and the safety pilots indicated that no severe problems were encoun- 
tered during takeoff and climbout. 
During the takeoff roll, heading reference was good, but the pitch reference re- 
quired the pilot to adapt to the position of the objectives on top of the airplane. The 
changed pitch reference and the lack of a convenient airspeed reference resulted in 
poor control of rotation speed and angle. Also during takeoff roll, vibration of the 
system was bothersome. 
During climb, the pitch reference was degraded somewhat because the horizon in 
climb attitude was at the bottom of the view field where the resolution was degraded. 
In addition, view to the side was not available for use as a pitch reference. During 
climb, roll and heading references were adequate. One pilot even thought that roll and 
yaw cues were better through the optics. 
Landings 
During the program, 49 landings were performed. As indicated by the safety 
pilot's comments, most of the ratings were in the good-to-acceptable range. Also, 
the pilots, as indicated by their responses to the questionnaires and their other com- 
ments, were generally satisfied with their performances. 
Landings did, however, indicate the major limitation of the system--a lack of 
adequate field of view to the sides. As indicated in appendix A by both the subject pilots 
and the safety pilots, judging position in the pattern relative to the runway was difficult 
when the runway was not in the field of view. To avoid this limitation, the pilots flew 
patterns with long final approaches and used memorized landmarks around the local 
airfield, This problem was graphically demonstrated during the cross -country flight; 
the pilot was not familiar with the area around the airfields visited and because of air- 
traffic-control procedures was forced to fly a tight pattern. 
On six of the approaches, including both conventional and low lift-drag-ratio 
approaches, the pilots were allowed to use the side windows of the aircraft for position 
reference. On the low lift-drag-ratio approaches this was a great aid, and only a few 
transfers were made between the optics and the windows. During the conventional 
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approaches, many transfers were made. Since each transfer takes a relatively long 
time, the window-optic combination was not as useful in the conventional approaches as 
in the low lift-drag-ratio approaches. 
Another problem that was particularly evident during the approach and landing 
phase of the flights was the difficulty in transferring to the basic$light displays and 
back to the optics. This generally resulted in less frequent cross-checks and, thus, 
larger than normal airspeed excursions. The pilots also noted that on their first 
landings they would level out about 5 feet (1 .5 meters) above the ground. 
Night Flying 
On the flight conducted to evaluate the optics during night operations, three low 
lift-drag-ratio approaches were made, with one approach carried to touchdown. Ad- 
ditionally , two conventional approaches were performed and carried to touchdown. 
Basically, the night flying amplified the problems experienced during daytime 
flying. Because of loss of light in the system and the lack of view to the sides, navi- 
gation in the pattern was exceedingly difficult, which resulted in poor and inconsistent 
patterns. Also, as a result of the light loss, attitude control when flying toward the 
darker parts of the desert was very poor. 
In spite of the problems encountered in the pattern, once the runway was sighted 
on final approach, the landings proceeded normally with no unusual problems. 
The pilot believed that , i f  an inserted display of attitude and flight parameters , 
vision to the side, and better resolution were provided, consistently safe and ac- 
ceptable night approaches and landings could be performed. 
Stereoscopic Effects 
As  shown in figures 5 and 6(a), the objectives were located 15 inches (0.38 meter) 
apart on the top of the aircraft. In using the system, the pilot's eyes are effectively 
located in this position, which yields the impression shown in figure 4. 
While landing, rolling out, and taxiing, several anomalies were noted which imply 
that stereoscopic vision plays a significant role during these phases of operation. 
During landing the pilots consistently leveled off about 5 feet (1 .5 meters) above 
the ground when anticipating touchdown. While on the ground, the pilots thought they 
were traveling considerably slower than their actual speed, which resulted in high 
were not present. On one occasion, the pilot anticipated performing a 180" (T radian) 
turn on the runway while still traveling at 130 knots (66 meters/second). Both of these 
characteristics can be explained by the enhanced stereoscopic effect resulting from the 
wide objective separation. As shown in figure 11, an object a distance L from the 
observer will result in an eye-convergence angle a! that depends on the eye (or 
objective) separation 2s according to the relation L = a! , assuming small angles. 
1 taxi speeds. This was noted particularly at night when other depth-perception cues 
S As 
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objective i 
Figure 11.- Sketch of stereopsis. 
shown, the eye and mind interpret 
distance by the relation 
S =AYE Lapparent 
The problem that arises with the 
optics is that 
Soptics 
Lactual= a 
or  
S Lactual - optics 
Lapparent Seye ' 
L 
Simply stated, the object appears 
closer than it actually is by the ratio 
of objective separation to eye sepa- 
ration. Differentiation of the distance 
equation yields the velocity relation- 
- 
, 
ship 
By using the same line of reasoning 
m as in the distance case, objects also 
soptics. 
Seye 
appear to be moving slower by this same ratio, 
Operational Problems 
Several operational problems were encountered with the optics. They are pre- 
sented herein not as program results but as items to be avoided in the design of future 
systems. 
System alinement and proper pilot head position were difficult to achieve, since 
the eyepieces and relay sections were adjusted independently of the objectives. This 
resulted in the optical axes of the eyepieces not necessarily being parallel to those of 
the objectives when adjustments were made for interpupillary distance. This lack of 
alinement appeared as rotations of the individual field of view. The converse was also 
true; in adjustments for zero image rotation, it was difficult to maintain the proper 
interpupillary distance. This feature resulted in an alinement procedure that is much 
too tedious and time-consuming for normal aircraft operations with more than one 
pilot. 
I 
System vibration was encountered that resulted in a rather severe loss of vision 
while the aircraft was on the ground. During the early phases of the program, 
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vibration was sufficient to alter the preflight alinement of the system and make it 
necessary to use additional clamps on the objectives. 
The system was difficult to keep optically clean because of (1) bugs and dirt on the 
domes and (2) paint chips from the prisms and mirror mountings collecting on the 
lenses. Of the two, the bugs were the greatest problem, since each bug would blur 
about a 10" (0.1'7-radian) diameter section in the field of view. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Flight tests of a wide-angle, indirect optical viewing system as a means of pro- 
viding pilots of a high-performance jet aircraft with visual reference resulted in the 
following conclusions: 
1. Safe and acceptable performance in all phases of daylight visual flight could 
be achieved with the use of the viewing system. 
2. The system, in its present form, is considered to be unusable for night 
operations because of large light losses and degraded resolution. 
3. Pitch-attitude sensing in daytime flight with the viewing system was marginal 
during climbing flight. 
resolution at the bottom of the field and the lack of view to the sides. 
attitude sensing were satisfactory during daytime flight. 
This degraded pitch-attitude sensing was due to the poor 
Roll and yaw 
4. Enhanced stereoscopic vision resulted in conflicting distance and motion cues 
but did not prevent successful operations. 
5. Lack of view to the side degraded all circling approaches. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
On the basis of the experience with the system and the deficiencies observed 
during this evaluation, the following features are recommended for consideration in 
the design of future short-eye-relief optical viewing systems: 
1. View to the side of the aircraft to provide the pilot with the capability of 
per forming circling appro aches comfort ably. 
2. Display of basic flight parameters in the optical field to reduce the number of 
transfers of vision out of the optics. 
3. Display of aircraft attitude in the optical field to improve pilot performance 
during night flying. 
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4. Larger exit pupils to prevent the pilot from losing the view during in-flight 
acceleration and vibration. 
Flight Research Center , 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Edwards, Calif. , August 12, 1966. 
125-19-01-02-24 
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMARY OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
PILOT QUESTIONNAIRE 
General Questions 
1. Was the visual field ever blurred due to vibration of the optics? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
Yes, slightly on takeoff and significantly on landing. 
Yes, mainly on the runway. Frequently out of focus due to head 
position. 
Yes,  during takeoff roll and in light-moderate turbulence at low 
altitude. 
Yes, takeoff primarily; however, flight was made in the late after 
noon and considerable turbulence was encountered. 
Yes, most pronounced during takeoff and landing roll. 
Yes,  during landing roll during nosewheel shimmy. 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A 
B Very little. Ground only and then not much. 
C 
D 
E 
Yes, slightly on takeoff and landing but not during flight. 
Did not make second flight. ] 
Yes, takeoff and at low altitude due to moderate turbulence. 
Yes, most noticeably during landing and takeoff roll. Vibration on 
the ground and in flight gives the impression of a degradation of 
focus. 
F Yes, in turbulence. 
2. Did you experience any extreme discomfort due to being forced to maintain a 
set head position with respect to the eyepieces? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A No. 
B No. 
C No. 
D 
E 
F 
Not extreme; however, the flight duration of 45 minutes is as much 
No, except my jaw was sore after the flight. 
Position was tiring, but no extreme discomfort. 
as I care to tolerate. 
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Second flight: 
Pilot 
A No. 
B No. 
C 
D No. 
E No. 
F No. 
Did not make second flight. 3 
3a. Did you purposely or accidentally lose the exit pupil at any time during the 
flight ? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A 
B 
C 
D 
Yes. Interpupillary distance was set too narrow, and I quite often 
Yes, once only inadvertently, adjusted the recorder in my pocket. 
Yes, I had to move out of the eyepieces to see altitude and airspeed. 
I would estimate that I had both exit pupils less than 10 percent of 
lost the left exit pupil while centering the right one. 
Also every time I cross-checked instruments. 
the time. I had one clear one about 30 percent of the time and 
poor vision in both 70 percent of the time. 
E Yes, purposely. 
F Yes, particularly in rough air and when trying to cross -check 
airspeed and altitude. 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A No. 
B Purposely, to cross-check airspeed. 
C Did not make second flight. ] 
D Yes, both, but, due to better adjustment, no problem reacquiring. 
E No. 
F Yes, in turbulence and in approaches when pulling "g" and 
occasionally when trying to cross -check instruments. 
3b. If so, was reacquisition of the pupil at all difficult? And, what was the cause 
of this loss (turbulence, distraction, reference to the instruments, high g loads, 
etc. ) ?  
First flight: 
Pilot 
A No, see question 3a. 
B No. 
C No. 
16 
APPENDIX A 
1 
D Reacquisition of even one pupil was difficult. Vibration and turbu- 
lence prevented me from getting into the ground-adjusted position. 
The mask and helmet also caused problems in getting back into a 
good position due to interference with optic structure. 
E No. 
F No, see question 3a. 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A No. 
B NO. 
C 
D See question 3a. 
E No. 
F 
Did not make second flight. ] 
Sometimes difficult to get back in focus. 
4. On making turns, was the acquisition of heading references appearing at edges 
of the view field a problem? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A Yes. 
B No. 
C 
D No. 
E No. 
F 
No,  general area orientation was quite simple. Very easy to point it 
just where I wanted to be going. 
Yes, eyes were too far back. 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A 
B 
C 
D No. 
E 
F Yes. 
Yes, optical quality is poor. 
It is an effort, partly because of resolution. 
[Did not make second flight. ] 
Yes, because of the poor resolution at the edge of the field of view. 
5. Was lack of normal fuselage and wing-tip reference noticeably troublesome ? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A Not at all. 
B 
C No. 
D 
E No. 
No, since fuselage is in the field. 
No, some tendency to fly at higher nose attitudes than usual. 
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F No, longitudinal attitude was a little more difficult to adjust 
accurately. 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A No. 
B No, references very good. 
C 
D No. 
E No. 
F No. 
Did not make second flight. ] 
Takeoff and Climbout 
1. Did you experience any difficulty holding heading during takeoff roll? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A No. 
B No. 
C 
D No. 
E 
F 
No, quite easy in spite of aircraft vibration causing some distortion. 
No,  this is probably one of the easier tasks. 
Did not take off initially; on touch and go landings, heading control 
was no problem. 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A No. 
B No. 
C 
D No. 
E No. 
F No. 
Did not make second flight. ] 
2. Was downward vision adequate for establishing and maintaining proper pitch 
angle on climbout? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A Yes. 
B 
C 
D Yes. 
More than adequate in a shallow climb; inadequate in steep climb. 
Yes , both in afterburner and military. 
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E I don't know why, as yet, but pitch attitude is difficult to judge. I 
flew the same climb schedule as the one flown when I was safety 
pilot. The pitch attitude seemed much lower through the optics; 
in fact, I rotated to a higher pitch angle than I desired, yet it 
looked low. 
Attitude control (longitudinally) was slightly difficult to establish 
accurately. 
F 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A Yes. 
B Fair. 
C 
D Yes. 
E 
F 
Did not make second flight.] 
Yes,  but here again the climbout pitch angle appeared to be lower 
Not as good as if normal vision was used. 
than when looking out the window. 
3. Was your view of the horizon adequate at higher pitch angles for maintaining 
wings -level attitude ? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A Yes. 
B 
C 
D Yes. 
E 
F Yes  
Yes, up to about 15" (0.26 radian) pitch attitude. 
Up to 20" (0.35 radian) pitch attitude. 
Keeping the wings level was never a problem. In fact, it seems that 
visual roll cues are amplified through the optics. Is this possible? 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A Not evaluated. 
B 
C 
D Yes. 
E Yes. 
F Yes. 
Not very good, but okay when a conscious effort is made. 
Did not make second flight. I 
Maneuvers 
1. On making turns, was holding a given roll angle difficult, once established? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A No. 
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B No. 
C 
D No. 
E 
Not bad within -+5" (50.09 radian). 
No, but pitch reference was difficult to determine during turns. I 
had to cross-check the altimeter much more frequently during 
turns. A rate-of-climb indicator would be very helpful. 
F No,  although not quite as good as regular flying. 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A No. 
B No. 
C 
D No. 
E 
F Not bad. 
Did not make second flight. ] 
No, but maintaining altitude in the turn is rather difficult. 
Approach and Landing 
1. Did you have any problems maintaining proper approach speed, cross- 
checking between the exterior view field and instruments ? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A Low lift-drag-ratio approaches were no problem. Resented having 
to cross-check airspeed on normal landings because I had no 
peripheral vision. 
radio calls. 
B 
C 
D No. 
E 
F Not much. 
Some, not too bad. Would be bad if there were a lot of traffic o r  
Not a problem, it was just a pain! 
Yes, I continually got slow in the approach. 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A 
B No. 
C 
D No. 
E 
Yes, cross-check takes you out of the optics. 
Did not make second flight. I 
No problem during the touch and go's, but I did experience some 
problem with speed control during the low lift-drag-ratio 
approaches. I tended to get slow at the 180°(7r radian) position. 
F Some difficulty. 
2. Did downward vision seem adequate for establishing high- and low-key points? 
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First flight: 
Pi1.t 
A No. 
B Would like much more. 
C 
D 
E 
No ,  worst case is low key, where I found it hard to get proper abeam 
position. 
Yes, but lateral vision is the important one in pattern, and this was 
marginal and probably would not be adequate at a strange field. 
No ,  normally I do not use landmarks for low lift-drag-ratio 
approaches. Therefore, I had no preplanned reference points. 
This was a definite disadvantage. 
F No,  particularly high key. 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A No. 
B Fair . 
C 
D Yes. 
E 
F No. 
Did not make second flight.] 
Yes, i f  you roll the airplane at high key. 
3. How well could you judge flare -point altitude ? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A Ekcellently. 
B 
C 
D Surprisingly well. 
E Quite well. I think, in general, flare-initiation altitude was a bit 
As well as direct visual. 
Fairly consistently leveled off 5 feet to 10 feet (1.5 meters to 
3.1 meters) high. 
high, but i f  one keeps the speed on the high side, this does not 
present a problem. 
F Not quite as good as normal. 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A 
B Very well. 
C 
D 
E 
F 
Just as well as without optics. 
Did not make second flight. 3 
Fair, tended to flare high, but this was possibly due to M-2 lifting 
body approach practice. 
No t  as well as looking out, but I was satisfied with this part of the 
approach. 
N o t  quite as good as normal. 
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4. Did you notice any exaggerated stereo-vision effects during flare and post- 
flare ? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A 
B No. 
C 
D No. 
E No. 
F No. 
Tended to Wnd slightly high, 
sooner than I actually did. 
i. e. , thought I would touch down 
No, except poor height judgment. 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A 
B No. 
C 
D Postflare height was misjudged. 
E No. 
F No. 
Okay during flare. After flare there is an impression that the air- 
craft is about 5 feet (1 .5  meters) lower than is actually the case. 
Did not make second flight. 3 
5. Did performance on landings seem to improve as you gained experience with 
the optics? 
First flight: 
Pilot 
A Yes. 
B No. 
C Yes. 
D Can't say. 
E 
F Yes. 
Yes, I think the important factor is that one's confidence level goes 
UP. 
Second flight: 
Pilot 
A Yes. 
B Yes. 
C 
D Yes. 
E 
F Some. 
Did not make second flight. I 
Yes, I am sure that experience plays an extremely important part 
in satisfactory performance. 
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SUMMARY OF SAFETY -PILOT QUESTIONNAIRE 
Safety -Pilot Ratings 
1. Takeoff roll rotation 
X 
VF I X! z- L- zs 'X L% L X  I 
X 
Good Acceptable Bad 
2. Establishing and maintaining rate of climb 
X 
X X X 
1 Y Y  " I  Y X 
X 
X 
1- 1- I I 
Good Acceptable Bad 
3. Straight-and-level flying, holding altitude 
X X 
I v v v  v v v  V I  -_ v v -- -- -- -- -- I ------ I 
Good Acceptable Bad 
4. Holding bank angles turning 
X X 
I Y Y  v -- -_ V I  X ,  
x x x  
_ _  - _ _  I 
Good Acceptable Bad 
5. Establishing and maintaining glide slope approach speed 
X X 
Y Y  v I v 
1- 1L 1% , 11 1Tc - - = *  I 
X 
Good Acceptable Bad 
6. Establishing high- and low-key points 
X X 
I A R A n R  I R L% d 
X 
Good Acceptable Bad 
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7. Judging altitude preflare and postflare 
X X X X X 
xc Y Y Y I Y Y I 
Good Acceptable Bad 
-i 
_ _  
X 
8.  Overall landing performance (each landing rated separately) 
X X 
X 
X 
X X 
X X 
x x x  
x x x x  x x x  X X X 
X X 
X t-- -= -- -- Y I *- "I- Y Y  Y Y Y x$ 1: :: 
Good Acceptable Bad 
x x x x  x x x  X X 
X x x x  X 
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ADDITIONAL PILOTS' FLIGHT NOTES 
PILOT A - FIRST FLIGHT 
Upon entering the cockpit, it was noticed that the exit-pupil interpupillary distance 
was set slightly too small for the pilot. Since correction of this would have delayed 
flight, it was accepted. The maladjustment required that the pilot's eyes be held 
slightly closer than the normal eye-relief distance of 0.83  inch (21 millimeters) in 
order to have the full  field of view through both optics. This maladjustment also 
reduced the lateral allowable head movement and is felt to have degraded the pilot's 
performance slightly but not significantly. It did, however, illustrate the necessity of 
having this adjustment properly set for the individual pilot prior to each future flight. 
While the safety pilot was taxiing to the runway, the project pilot observed that 
through the optics the horizon appeared to slope gradually up, perhaps 5" (0.09 radian), 
oil each side of the center due to misalinement. 
problem in flight. 
This phenomenon proved not to be a 
The project pilot made a normal and satisfactory takeoff and climb to 25,000 feet 
(7.6 kilometers). Turns and one aileron roll were performed without complications. 
One straight-in and two circular low lift-drag-ratio approaches were performed 
to lakebed runway 18 (Edwards Air Force Base). None of the approaches was flown to 
touchdown but all appeared that they would have resulted in satisfactory touchdowns. 
One circular low lift-drag-ratio approach was performed to the main runway, termi- 
nating in a satisfactory landing. 
Three landings were  performed on the runway with the takeoff-flap setting. Al l  
touchdowns were smooth, but were quite long (ZOO0 to 5000 feet (0 .61  to 1.52 kilo- 
meters) down the runway). This touchdown dispersal could be reduced considerably 
with practice and the resultant increased confidence in the use of the optics. 
Height and rate-of-sink perception were excellent during all approaches, with the 
exception of the last few feet prior to touchdown, where the impression was that the 
F-104B was closer to the ground than it actually was. This presented no problem in 
acquiring smooth touchdowns but did result in touchdowns 500 to 1000 feet (0.15 to 
0 . 3 1  kilometer) past the predicted touchdown point. 
Difficulties in circling approaches due to restricted (130" (2.3 radians)) horizontal 
field of view were exactly as anticipated from previous participation in a restricted- 
field-of-view program with a T-33 airplane. Using the optics only, there was no way 
to precisely locate high-key position on the circular low lift-drag-ratio approaches. 
This position had to be located by flying airspeed for 15 seconds after the runway 
disappeared from view approaching high key. The runway was reacquired in view 
briefly on the downwind leg but disappeared again prior to the final turn, which had to 
be commenced by estimate. 
(1.2 radians or  1.4 radians) of turn remained, and there was some tendency to 
The runway was not seen again until only 70" or  80" 
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overshoot the final turn. These difficulties generally were repeated in the power-on 
approaches and emphasized the requirement for side vision when accomplishing 
circling approaches. 
Location of the optics with respect to the seat was'excellent; the pilot was able to 
maintain his eyes in the exit pupils while assuming a normal flying position. The 
headrest and the oxygen-mask retainer combined to provide good protection for the 
pilot's eyes and cheekbones. 
The altimeter and airspeed indicator were conveniently located on the center 
pedestal and required very little head and eye motion for cross-check. 
desirability of one additional cockpit instrument was ascertained; a slaved gyro would 
be helpful in determining downwind leg heading, particularly in an area unfamiliar to 
the pilot. 
The 
The project pilot flew the entire mission from takeoff roll to completion of final 
landing roll and at no time removed his eyes from the optics except to cross-check 
instruments. 
PILOT B - SAFETY PILOT COMMENTS ON FIRST FLIGHT OF PILOT A 
All maneuvers on this flight, including takeoff and some of the taxiing, were done 
from the rear cockpit. In all respects, piloting performance was as good as when 
using the windows , with the following exceptions : 
1. Handling of power in all flight regimes, but especially circling low lift-drag- 
ratio approaches and final approaches in conventional patterns, showed evidence of less 
frequent cross-check of airspeed, power, and altitude than is usually the case for 
Pilot A. 
2. High-key and low-key positions in circling low lift-drag-ratio patterns, as 
well as the 180" ( 7r radian) point in conventional approaches, were located less 
precisely and consistently than would normally be the case. This was because the 
pilot was using the optics alone and was not able to see the runway at high key o r  low 
key. Since the runway could not be seen from low key, there could be no judgment 
whether the approach was high o r  low at that point. Similarly, the pilot did not h o w  
whether he was high o r  low on the glide path until half through the base turn on con- 
ventional patterns. This caused all final approaches to be steep and caused touch- 
downs to be long. 
The accurate perception of altitude during flare and landing both for conventional 
and for simulated flameout patterns was particularly noteworthy. Directional control 
during landing and takeoff was excellent without the yawing o r  crabbing frequently 
associated with back-seat takeoffs o r  landings. The safety pilot made only one cor- 
rection, that of modifying the gear-down speeds due to an airspeed-indicator error 
either in the front or the rear cockpit. 
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PILOT B - FIRST FLIGHT 
The entire flight was considered easy, and there was no trouble in achieving 
desired touchdown points o r  projected touchdown points on the last two circling low 
lift-drag-ratio approaches and the four conventional landings. 
of Pilot A in the first flight, it was considered that attempts to flare prior to being 
over the runway would not entail unreasonable risk. The first simulated flameout 
pattern resulted in a projected touchdown point approximately 2000 feet (0.61 kilo- 
meter) long because of the poor determination of high-key position. 
Based on the experience 
The next two simulated flameout approaches were made by placing the high-key 
point deliberately long and high to allow the approach end of the runway to be seen 
through the optical system at low key. Touchdown points were satisfactory. 
Approaches to the main runway for conventional landings were made in a normal 
manner except for using the magnetic compass in the front cockpit for downwind 
reference. Conventional patterns were deliberately flown wide, with long final ap- 
proaches, similar to the no-flap patterns. Touchdowns (on four landings) were be- 
tween 1500 to 2300 feet (0.46 to 0.70 kilometer) from the approach end of the runway, 
which is normal for Pilot B. Patterns on which the landing-flap settings were used 
resulted in longer touchdowns because power cross -check was required. 
Perception of rate of descent on a short final approach, estimation of flare point, 
and prediction of touchdown were, i f  anything, better than by direct visual contact 
because of the far greater field of view directly down and forward afforded by the 
optical system. 
The following comments are made in the order in which they came to the pilot's 
attention during flight. It should be noted that these comments represent undesirable 
features of the optical system which are either of a trivial or "housekeeping" nature 
that could be easily remedied on the next design o r  eliminated by enlarging the field 
of view. 
1. The field of view forward and down was not adequate for horizon reference on 
a steep climbout, since such reference is usually obtained by looking 45" (: radian) 
to either side of the cockpit. 
and was marginal at altitude. 
Perception of rate of climb near the ground was poor 
2. Vibration was bothersome when the helmet touched any part of the optical 
supporting structure o r  the pads. 
3. Focus was poor unless adjustment of the pilot's eye position was made 
frequently. 
4. Flap indicators were hidden by the stick in most normal stick positions. 
5. Airspeed indicator and altimeter were dark by contrast to the optical picture 
when flying toward the sun and, hence, were difficult to see. 
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6. In spite of the difficulty in cross-check, it was not difficult to keep airspeed 
on final approach to within h5 knots (rt2.6 meters/second) of the desired. If there 
were distractions, however, this might not be possible. 
7. Approaches made with landing-flap settings were difficult from the point of 
view of cross-check, since power had to be cross-checked on these approaches in 
addition to airspeed. 
8. The aircraft could have been easily stopped before reaching the center taxiway 
on the Edwards Air Force Base main runway. However, the center taxiway appeared 
to  be much farther away than it really was so that braking was not started until the 
airspeed had decreased below 90 knots (45 meters/second). This made it necessary 
to turn around on the runway and taxi back approximately 30 feet (9.2 meters). 
PILOT E - COMMENTS ON FIRST AND SECOND FLIGHTS 
For some reason, the pilot was not positive of his pitch attitude after nose-gear 
lift-off during the takeoff rotation. 
Some difficulty was encountered in achieving the desired focus during the final 
phase of the circling low lift-drag-ratio approaches due to the rapid rate of closure 
with the aim point. This was not nearly as much a problem during the touch-and-go 
landings because of the relatively low vertical velocity prior to touchdown. 
High crosswinds at high key further complicated the problem of approaching with- 
out having a side window. A perfect "mechanical'! approach could be flown to the low- 
key point, but, without some additional references, the crosswind would result in 
drift to the side. 
A higher high-key position and a slightly wider pattern might be a better way to 
use the optical system. 
Long finall approaches made the conventional landings more comfortable. 
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PILOT AND SAFETY PILOT NOTES ON CROSS-COUNTRY FLIGHT 
PILOT B 
The purpose of this flight was to investigate the use of the optics for cross- 
country flight and visual approaches and landings at three unfamiliar fields. The 
flight plan was to perform a touch-and-go landing at George Air Force Base, the 
Naval Ordnance Test Station (NOTS) at China Lake, Calif. , and at Air Force Plant 42 
in Palmdale, Calif. , and to make a full-stop landing at Edwards Air Force Base 
(fig. 10). The pilot had landed previously only on the Edwards runway. Navigational 
aids o r  straight-in approaches were purposely not used. 
The approach at George Air Force Base was uneventful. On this approach, section 
lines on the ground and the magnetic compass in the front seat were used. This com- 
pass can be used when the aircraft is straight and level but cannot be used during the 
turns. Touchdown was somewhere between 1000 and 2000 feet (0 .31 and 0.61  kilo- 
meter) from the threshold. Pilot E felt that the aircraft was somewhat low over the 
overrun; however, with a fuel load in excess of 5000 pounds (22,200 newtons), a 
successful full-stop landing without the drag chute would necessitate an approach of 
this nature. 
The pattern was flown with takeoff flaps because of the inadequate go-around 
capability with the landing-flap setting at the higher fuel weights. Height judgment 
near the ground during the flare was not as good as normal in more familiar sur- 
roundings. 
The approach to NOTs was complicated by the fact that the tower requested a 
tight pattern and specified no flight over the housing area. This necessitated a final 
approach of 4000 feet (1 .22 kilometers) o r  less,  which is completely inadequate in an 
F-104 with a 3 , 500 -pound (16 , 000-newton) fuel load under any condition. Because of 
the inadequate go-around capability with the landing-flap setting, takeoff flaps were 
used. 
Navigation on the downwind leg proved to be no problem; however, the turn to 
final approach was a problem. Even while maintaining 240 knots (120 meters/second) 
indicated, the aircraft was still at an undesirably high angle of attack. On this ap- 
proach, lack of a heading reference during the turn to final approach and lack of air- 
speed or angle-of-attack reference within the field of view added considerable dif- 
ficulty. The primary problem at NOTS, however, was not the optical system but the 
non-standard approach required by the tower, which was incompatible with an F-104B 
at that fuel weight. 
Coming over the overrun, Pilot E commented that the aircraft was much too low. 
However, a successful full-stop landing without a drag chute on such a short runway 
at that fuel weight would require an approach in which the wheels were inches above 
the overrun. Because of Pilot E's comment, power was added over the overrun, thus 
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preventing a touch-and-go landing. No pitch correction was made. On the next pat- 
tern, the tower again requested a close pattern. The turn to final approach was at as 
high an angle of attack as possible and was overshot. A go-around from a short final 
approach was elected. 
The approach and landing on runway 07 at Air Force Plant 42 was uneventful since 
a wide pattern was allowed. By that time, Pilot E was becoming apprehensive about 
low flares over the overrun, so the approach was flown as Pilot E did the day before, 
that is , by maintaining 90 -percent power to touch down with landing flaps and touching 
down at 170 to 175 knots (87 to 90 meters/second), 30 knots (15 meters/second) faster 
than the normal landing-flap touchdown speed. This technique is not acceptable except 
on very long runways, since it adds about 4000 feet (1.2 kilometers) to the stopping 
distance above that required for a normal landing with landing-flap setting. Again, 
altitude judgment above the runway was not as good as in familiar surroundings. 
Generally, the flight was a particularly and probably unreasonably severe test of 
the optics, since neither a heads-up display nor navigational information was available 
and straight-in approaches were not used. The situation at NOTS was essentially an 
impossible one for an F-104 at that fuel weight, regardless of whether or not optics 
were used. Even here, however, a heads-up display of heading, airspeed, and angle 
of attack would have made a great deal of difference. Also, use of side windows would 
have helped. 
For the first time, better resolution might have assisted in determining height 
above the ground when close to touchdown. This was not nearly as evident at Edwards 
Air Force Base, where the size of objects on the ground are known. The resolution 
of this system may be adequate but head position was not properly maintained because 
of the necessity of performing other tasks. 
PILOT E - SAFETY PILOT COMMENTS ON CROSS-COUNTRY FLIGHT 
The takeoff, climbout, and cruise to George Air  Force Base were normal. 
Pilot B was able to navigate satisfactorily utilizing the optics. He remarked that the 
section lines and roads that were parallel to and perpendicular to the runway aided in 
flying the approach pattern. The landing was satisfactory with a tendency to flare a 
bit too high. 
The navigational task to NOTS was performed well. On approaching, the tower 
requested a hold 9 miles southeast of the field. This approach caused a little trouble, 
probably because Pilot B did not have a compass and directional orientation was dif- 
ficult with a reduced field of view. The control tower placed two severe restrictions 
on the traffic pattern: (1) the downwind leg had to be quite close to the active runway 
to remain clear of a firing range, and (2) the final approach was considerably shortened 
to remain clear of a housing area. 
The two approaches to NOTS were very difficult. The restrictions imposed by the 
tower caused the approach turn to be very tight and the final approach leg to be ex- 
tremely short. Angle of attack was undesirably high during both approaches and 
reached a very high value on the second approach. On both occasions, the final leg 
was overshot. On the second attempt the overshoot was sufficient to require an 
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immediate go-around. A landing was made during the first attempt, although the 
safety pilot made a back-stick input during the approach to correct for a too-low 
situation just short of the runway. 
The rest of the flight was normal, although Pilot B did experience some concern 
about lateness in visually picking up the runway during the final approach at Plant 42. 
At Edwards, the flare was a bit high, resulting in a late touchdown. Rollout was to 
the end of the runway. 
In summary, it appears that at an unfamiliar field the pilot spends a great deal 
more time determining geographic position; consequently, less time is spent "flying 
the airplane" and observing flight parameters. This could lead to dangerous flight 
conditions. The difference in time spent f'looking out!' of the airplane at a strange 
field with and without the optics would be interesting to determine. 
1 
A straight-in approach at NOTs probably would not have caused any problem. 
However , the approach required was essentially impossible. 
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APPENDIX D 
PILOT A FLIGHT NOTES ON NIGHT FLIGHT 
This flight, an evaluation of the optics during twilight and darkness, had been pre- 
ceded by proficiency flights in an F-104N the previous night and one night during the 
preceding week. These flights had indicated a requirement for beginning power-off 
landing flare by use of the altimeter, at least for the pilot's level of night proficiency. 
If the flare was performed by intuition, it was commenced early, causing touchdown to 
occur too slow and too far down the runway. In the F-104N this appeared to be the only 
item that made night landings different from daylight landings. 
1 
The evaluation flight was preceded immediately by a daylight proficiency flight in 
the test aircraft. Four power-off and two power-on approaches were performed with- 
out difficulty. 
Takeoff was at 2005 hours, 15 minutes after official sunset. The debilitating ef- 
fects of light loss in the optical system were immediately apparent; the horizon, which 
was almost masked by haze to the naked eye, was totally lost through the optics. Also, 
dry lakes used for navigation were lost in the twilight when the optics were used. The 
first power-off approach was successfully performed, but no landing was made due to 
conflicting traffic. This pattern was made with some twilight remaining. 
While attempting to return to high key for a second power-off approach, the pilot 
mistook Lancaster, Calif., for Edwards, Calif. (fig. lo), and had to accomplish an 
additional 360" (2 7r radian) turn to get to high key after recognizing his mistake. The 
error  is ascribed to the poor optical quality of the system; lights are so blurred as to 
change the character of a lighted community. 
The second approach was flown to a successful touchdown, but considerable 
turning was required during the final approach to line up with the runway and to dis- 
sipate excess energy. The difficulty in accomplishing the power-off pattern is believed 
to be due to loss of navigation cues (particularly Rogers Dry Lake at Edwards Air 
Force Base) which had been available in the F-104N but were not present in the F-104B 
due to loss of light through the optics. 
The third high key was successfully located, but final turn was too close in and 
was undershot. A successful landing flare was accomplished, but the landing was not 
made because the touchdown would have occurred within 2500 feet (0.76 kilometer) of 
the far end of the runway. 
Two successful power-on approaches and landings were made. Pitch control in 
these patterns was substandard, probably due to poor pitch-attitude cues through the 
optics plus very limited flight instrumentation in the rear seat of the airplane. No 
other inadequacies were noted during the power-on approaches. 
It was felt that if an optical system were to be used operationally it should possess 
optical quality sufficient to cause minimum distortion of lighted objects. Light loss 
would probably be inherent in any system, so terminal guidance would most likely be 
required for any vehicle landing by optics at night. 
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